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INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIPS AND THE CLAYTON
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VICTOR H. KRAMERt
"MORGAN FIlm OUT OF THIRTY BOARDS" was the front-page
headline in the New York Times for January 3, 1914. In a public state-
ment, Mr. J. P. Morgan said:
"The necessity of attending many board meetings has been so
serious a burden upon our time that we have long wished to with-
draw from the Directorates of many corporations. Most of these
Directorships we have accepted with reluctance, and only because
we felt constrained to keep in touch with properties which w6 had
reorganized or whose securities we had recommended to the public,
both here and abroad. An apparent change in public sentiment in
regard to Directorships seems now to warrant us in seeking to re-
sign from some of these connections.
"Indeed it may be, in view of the change in sentiment upon this
subject, that we shall be in a better position to serve such properties
and their security holders, if we are not Directors. We have already
resigned from the companies mentioned, and we expect from time to
time to withdraw from other boards upon which we feel there is no
special obligation to remain." I
The Morgan announcement created a sensation 2 and was heralded
as an "epoch-making" event. 3 Colonel House wired President Wilson
that Morgan's action was "an indication that big business is preparing
to surrender unconditionally." 4
Wilson himself, in his message to Congress on January 20, 1914,
stated that "the antagonism between business and Government is
over." 5 Nevertheless, he persisted in his recommendation that laws
be enacted
t Trial Attorney and Assistant Chief, Trial Section, Antitrust Division, United States
Department of Justice. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflcct
the views of the Department of Justice.
1. New York Times, Jan. 3, 1914, p. 1, col. 1. Samuel Untermeyer, who had been
counsel for the Pujo Committee, was quick to point out that despite the resignations by
some partners, others remained on the same boards. Id., p. 2, col. 3. In addition, the
thirty resignations included several from subsidiary corporations. Nevertheless, after the
resignations there was no longer any Morgan partner as a director of the New York
Central, the New York, New Haven and Hartford, or American Telephone and Telegraph.
Id., p. 1, col. 1.
2. As an amusing illustration of the public excitement and importance attributed to
the Morgan announcement, see Meaning of the Morgan Withdrawals, 48 LITERARY DIGEST
89 (1914), particularly the cartoons at 90-91.
3. Philadelphia North American, quoted in 48 LITERARY DIGEST 89, 92 (1914).
4. BAKER, 4 WOODROW WILSON 369 (1931).
5. Id. at 370.
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". .. which will effectually prohibit and prevent such interlock-
ings of the personnel of the directorates of great corporations-
banks and railroads, industrial, commercial, and public-service
bodies-as in effect result in making those who borrow and those
who lend practically one and the same, those who sell and those who
buy but the same persons trading with one another under different
names and in different combinations, and those who affect to com-
pete in fact partners and masters of some whole field of business." c
Section 8 of the Clayton Act was the legislative response to the
Presidential recommendation. Although it fell pitifully short of his
objectives, Congress believed that it had carried out his recommenda-
tions.7 In their reports on the bill, the Committees of both the House
and the Senate said:
"The idea that there are only a few men in any of our great cor-
porations and industries who are capable of handling the affairs of
the same is contrary to the spirit of our institutions. . . . The
truth is that the only real service the same director in a great num-
ber of corporations renders is in maintaining uniform policies
throughout the entire system for which he acts, which usually re-
sults to the advantage of the greater corporations and to the dis-
advantage of the smaller corporations which he dominates by
reason of his prestige as a director and to the detriment of the pub-
lic generally." 8
Section 8 differentiates interlocking directorships in banks and com-
mon carriers from those in all other corporations engaged in interstate
commerce.9 That portion of the Section relating to interlocking direc-
torships in all but the two excepted classes provides in part as follows:
"... [N]o person at the same time shall be a director in any two
or more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and
undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in
whole or in part in commerce . . . if such corporations are or shall
have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of
operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by
agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of
the provisions of any of the antitrust laws." 10
6. See SEN. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914), quoting this part of the
President's message.
7. H.R. REP. No. 627, to accompany H.R. 15657, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1914);
SEN. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914).
8. Id. at 16. See the identical language in H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess.
19-20 (1914).
9. Section 10 of the Clayton Act deals with interlocking directorships in common
carriers.
10. This portion of Section 8 was passed in substantially the same form as in the bill
introduced by Mir. Clayton with the significant exception that a provision in the original
bill malting a violation a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment vas omitted.
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Consideration of the problems of interpretation arising out of the
quoted portion of Section 8 will suggest some of the shortcomings of
the statute. While the section raises several minor problems of con-
struction," the principal questions arise out of the meaning to be given
the clause, "so that the elimination of competition by agreement be-
tveen them would constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any
of the antitrust laws." Was this clause intended as a limitation on the
preceding word "competitors" so as to render unlawful only those
interlocking directorships between corporations that compete to a
"substantial" degree? Or is any amount of competition, however slight,
enough to outlaw an interlocking directorship?
The problem is accentuated as a result of the growth and diversifica-
tion of the production of many of the large manufacturing corpora-
tions. An example may serve to illustrate. X Company, whose princi-
pal lines are in the heavy chemical industry, also produces automobile
carburetors. In 1947, X's carburetor sales, valued at $1,500,000, con-
stituted less than three per cent of its total sales, and less than two per
cent of the total carburetor industry sales. X has on its board a Mr.
Jones who also serves on the board of Y, an automobile parts manufac-
turer. Y's sales of carburetors were $15,000,000 in 1947, or less than
twenty per cent of the industry total. Y's principal line was automobile
transmissions, its sales amounting to $40,000,000 in 1947. The dollar
value of Y's carburetor sales appears to be substantial although they
do not constitute a large percentage either of Y's total sales or total
sales by the carburetor industry. Is Jones violating Section 8? 12
One view has it that the "so that . . ." clause is merely explanatory
Section 11 of the Act gives various administrative agencies power to enforce the section
by administrative orders and Section 15 gives the Attorney General concurrent jurisdiction
to bring suits in equity in the district courts to prevent and restrain violations of the
Section.
11. For example, does the Section apply to directorships in two parent companies each
of which has a wholly-owned subsidiary where the subsidiaries are in competition but
not the parents? Where the major policies of the subsidiaries are dictated by the parents,
it would seem that there is a strong case for holding the directorships unlawful. See
Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L. J. 193 (1929) ; and see Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
12. Assuming that he is, are either of the corporations which elected him to its board
also violating Section 8? In any event, they can probably be named as defendants and an
injunction obtained against one of them prohibiting it from allowing Jones to continue to
serve on its board. See Section 11 of the Act giving the Federal Trade Commission
authority to enforce compliance with Section 8 and containing the following language:
"If . . the commission . . . shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions of
said sections [including Section 8] have been or are being violated, it . . . shall
issue ... an order requiring such person to . . . rid itself of the directors chosen
contrary to the provisions of Sections . . . 8 of this Act. .. ."
"Person" is defined by Section 1 of the Clayton Act to include corporations.
[Vol. 59:12661268
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of existing law; i.e., that agreements between competitors to eliminate
competition do violate the antitrust laws.13 Those of the contrary view
contend that not all such agreements violate the antitrust laws. An
agreement resulting in a merger of two competing concerns, for exam-
ple, does not necessarily violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. On the
other hand, if Congress had intended Section 8 to ban interlocking
directorships only in corporations that could not combine without
violating the antitrust laws, it would have been far simpler to join
Section 7, dealing with corporate combinations, with Section 8, or to
insert the word "substantial," which Congress had used in Section 7,
before the word "competitors" in Section 8.11
Taking the "so that . . ." clause at its face value, a strong argument
can be made that if the corporations in which the directorships are held
could not lawfully agree upon prices, they may not lawfully have inter-
locking directors. Such an agreement would eliminate competition
between them. Since price-fixing agreements are now unlawful per se
regardless of the amount of commerce affected,"5 this interpretation
renders the "so that .. ." clause practically meaningless as a limita-
tion upon the word "competitors." It seems probable nevertheless
that the courts will sustain an interpretation of the Section which gives
little or no weight to the amount of competitive commerce involved.
This view is influenced by recent Supreme Court opinions emphasizing
that it is the character of the restraint, not the amount of commerce
affected by it that is the factor determining illegality under the anti-
trust laws.'
6
13. One difficulty with this interpretation is that it neglects the words, "any of the
provisions of any of the antitrust laws."
14. That paragraph of Section 8 dealing with interlocking directors in banks as
originally passed in 1914 made unlawful interlocking directorships in two or more banks
over a prescribed size without regard to whether the banks were competitors. 33 STmT.
732 (1914). It was amended in 1916 by empowering the Federal Reserve Board to
authorize a director of a member bank to be "a director.., of not more than itwo other
banks . . .if such other bank... is not in substantial competition with such member
bank" 39 STAT. 121 (1916). It can be argued that the use of the "substantial competi-
tion" test in a bill relating to interlocking directorships in banks passed soon after the
Clayton Act indicates a Congressional awareness of the problem and a deliberate decision
to avoid the "substantial competition" test as applied to interlocking directors in industrial
corporations. It also may be argued that if Congress had intended the "substantial com-
petition" test to apply to interlocking directors in industrial corporations, it would not
have been necessary expressly to exempt interlocking directorships in competing corpora-
tions where each has assets of less than one million dollars. It is highly unlikely that
competition between two corporations engaged in interstate commerce having assets of
less than a million dollars could be "substantial."
15. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
16. E.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947) ; International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). In the Intcniational Salt case, a
tying clause restraining the sale of only 1500,000 of salt annually was held to violate Sec-
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Such an interpretation would give some real content to the Section,
but not enough to make it adequate to cope with the problem which it
attempted to treat.17 The objectives of Section 8 as disclosed by Wil-
son's message and the Committee reports quoted above were to reduce
the number of directorships held by one person in order (1) to eliminate
positions of conflicting trusts, (2) to induce directors to so concentrate
their responsibilities as to give them time to direct, (3) to create more
opportunities for others to rise to positions of prominence, and (4) to
prevent the use of interlocking directorships as a means of eliminating
competition. Yet the prohibitions of the Section achieve the first three
objectives only as incidental results produced by its prohibition of
interlocking directorships among competitors. And even in that limited
sphere it has failed to achieve its objectives, not only because it deals
only with directorships in competing corporations and gives no con-
sideration to other kinds of interlocking directorships that may elimi-
nate competition, but also because it was not, until recently, enforced.
The Federal Trade Commission has issued no cease and desist or-
ders under Section 8 of the Clayton Act.'" The Department of Justice
has instituted three suits in which violations of Section 8 have been
charged.'9 Either because of resignations by the directors sued, or
because of entry of a consent decree, none of these cases ever came
to trial. Suits have been filed by private parties claiming to have been
damaged by interlocking directorships, but apparently none has ever
been decided on the merits."
On October 11, 1947, the Attorney General announced that the
Department of Justice had conducted a survey of interlocking director-
ships held by some 10,000 persons in 1600 leading corporations. Of
tion 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, thus apparently overruling
sub silentio United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) ; cf. United
Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
17. Samuel Untermeyer, writing in April 1914 while the bill was before Congress,
urged that it be changed radically. He thought that the Section "strikes only at the form
and does not reach the substance of the greatest existing evil in corporate management.
. . The difficulty in solving this problem is not on the point of Interlocking Directorates.
It is in the interldcking control that the vice lies, whether evidenced by identity of stock-
holdings, through voting trust, dummy directors, or otherwise." Untermeyer, Completing
the Anri-Trust Programme, 199 NORTH AmERICAN REVIEW 528, 529 (1914). Mr. Nelson
who filed minority views in the House of Representatives with respect to the Clayton Act,
a month after Untermeyer's article, made similar criticisms. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
18. See Means, Interlocking Directorates in 8 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 148, 151 (1932). No
orders have been issued since the Means article was written.
19. See THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (CCH 1949) 142 (Case #316 against Rand
Kardex Bureau, et al.), 149 (Case #346 against General Outdoor Advertising Co., et al.),
167 (Case #408 against William G. Mather, et al.).
20. See, e.g., National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Pa., 1944);
Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1 (D. Haw., 1948),
rezld, 174 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1949).
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this group there were said to be approximately 1500 who held director-
ships in more than one concern. The Attorney General announced that
most of those persons holding directorships in violation of Section 8
had resigned without contest.
Articles in the public press have revealed the resignations of several
directors from the boards of two corporations and have attributed them
to the Department's program for enforcement of Section 8. One in-
stance is the resignation of three directors in General Electric who
were also directors in competing corporations including United States
Steel Corporation. 21 Another instance was the resignation of several
directors from the board of General Steel Castings Corporation because
of their directorships in Baldwin Locomotive Works and American
Steel Foundries.
22
The Department of Justice's extra-judicial procedure for wholesale
enforcement of Section 8 is a novel antitrust enforcement technique.
It has been customary to correct alleged violations by instituting law-
suits. But if enforcement by administrative persuasion accomplishes
the objectives of the statute, that method would seem to be not only
in the public interest but also in the interests of the persons whose
directorships are questioned since it gives them an opportunity to re-
sign without publicity and its attendant unpleasantness. Doubtless
this technique could not be used with success in correcting other types
of antitrust violations where the relief sought is highly complex. In
Section 8 matters, the relief desired is simple and specific: resignation
from all but one of the boards of the competing corporations.
Enforcement of Section 8 of the Clayton Act can be at least tem-
porarily upsetting to the business community. For over 30 years
virtually no attention has been paid to the Section by most corpora-
tions. Some boards, such as that of General Steel Castings Corpora-
tion, have had to be reconstituted as a result of recent enforcement.
In addition, the program of enforcement may encourage institution
of stockholders' actions attacking the legality of directorships. Man-
agement itself has used Section 8 to remove directors representing
"undesirable" minority interests.2 3
While Section 8 has been revitalized at least to the extent of the
vital capacities of its limited prohibition against interlocking director-
ships among competitors, most of the supposed evils it was designed
21. See New York Herald Tribune, March 23, 1949, p. 36, col. 3.
22. See the feature article by Robert P. Vanderpoel, Financial Editor, in the Chicago
Herald-American, May 8, 1948.
Standard Corporation Records, March 16, 1950, reported that C. H. Kreienbaum had
resigned from Harbor Plywood Corporation "because of notice from the Department of
Justice, Anti-Trust Division that his membership on the board violated provisions of the
Clayton Anti-Trust Act"
23. See National Supply Co. v. Hillman, 57 F. Supp. 4 (,V.D. Pa., 1944).
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to eliminate remain. A survey made recently of the directorships of
the thousand largest United States manufacturing corporations dis-
closes that there are approximately 1000 persons who hold more than
one directorship among these concerns. 2 14 There are about 32 men who
hold five or more. Of these 32, 20 are bankers, about evenly divided
between commercial banks and investment banking houses. The 32
men together hold one or more directorships in about 160 of the top
thousand manufacturing corporations and in over 85 non-manufacturing
corporations. The partners in two leading investment banking houses-
Lehman Brothers and Goldman, Sachs & Co.-hold directorships in
35 and 29, respectively, of the top thousand manufacturers and the
leading retailing corporations. The directors of J. P. Morgan & Co.,
Inc. (the banking corporation) hold an even twenty directorships in
the top thousand. These 20 corporations had total assets in 1946-47
of over eight billion, four hundred million dollars. This does not in-
clude these same directors' directorships in three Class A railroads
having combined total assets of $3,735,000,000. One of these roads-
mirabile dictu-is the New York Central from which all Morgan part-
ners proclaimed their withdrawal in 1914.6
The same bank frequently has partners or directors on the boards
of competing corporations. For example, Lehman Brothers has one
partner on the board of Fox and another on the RKO board (two of
the five major moving picture producers); Goldman Sachs has a partner
on the board of Cluett, Peabody and another on the board of Man-
hattan Shirt (the two largest men's shirt manufacturers); one Morgan
director is on the board of Kennecott Copper and another on the board
of Phelps Dodge, two of the three largest copper companies. Since,
in these examples, the same partner is not on the board of more than
one competitor, it would seem that their directorships are not in viola-
tion of Section 8. Nevertheless, this is the very evil that Congress
was apparently striving in Section 8 to correct.2"
It would seem inevitable that in serving the interests of the banking
firm in which the partners are primarily interested these directors
would consult each other regarding the activities of the competitors
24. All of the material in this paragraph is based upon PooR's REGISTER OF DIRECrORS
AND EXECUTIVES (1948); MOODY'S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS (Industrials, Railroads,
Banks-Insurance-Real Estate-Investment Trusts) (1947); and U.S. Dep't of Comm.,
1000 LARGEST MANUFACTURING CO"ORATIONS (1947).
25. See note 1 supra.
26. Of course, the Government can, under the Sherman Act, attack these directorships
if it can prove that they have been used to eliminate competition or otherwise restrain
trade. Compare the suit filed in 1947 in the Southern District of New York under the
Sherman Act against the leading investment bankers in which it was alleged that the de-
fendants utilized their positions as directors to encourage mergers. United States V.




in which each is a director. The decisions that each makes as a director
would seem inevitably to be influenced by the common interest of all
in the investment banking firm. The result insofar as the industrial
competitors are concerned must often be to effect a uniformity of
policies. But Section 8 apparently does not cover the situation. -
It would even seem lawful under Section 8 to designate a minor
employee of a corporation to sit on the board of a competitor so long
as the employee is not a director of the company by whom he is em-
ployed. Such a directorship might be declared unlawful under Section
8, but probably only if it were shown that the employee was in fact a
dummy who acted only upon the advice of his director-employer. And
any attempt to use the dummy director device to avoid further viola-
tions of Section 8 after a court trial would, perhaps, be ineffective. An
injunction might be obtained, in language broader than that of the
Act, so as to prevent a representative of the defendant from serving
in his place. 2s
That this means of avoiding or evading Section 8 is not hypothetical
is indicated by the change made in the board of General Steel Castings
Corporation after the Department called its attention to Section 8
of the Clayton Act.2s There, the board of the Castings Corporation
was made up in large part of persons who were also directors and prin-
cipal officers of two corporations that competed with it. In order to
avoid Section 8 these directors resigned from the Castings Corporation
and were replaced by persons who held lesser offices but were not direc-
tors in either of the two other corporations.31
27. While it is extremely doubtful that the Supreme Court would hold that this type
of interlocking directorship constitutes a per se offense under the Sherman Act, the
Court might rule that the existence of the banker-partners on the respective boards of
competing manufacturers created a presumption that competition had been restrained as a
result of a combination, and shift the burden of proof to the directors.
28. Cf. Purity Extract C6. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204-5 (1912). One of the bills as
drafted for consideration during the hearings on the Clayton Act undertook to prevent
employees of corporations from being directors in competitors. See Hearings before
Committee on Judiciary, H.R., on Trust Legislation, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. v. 2, p. 942
(1914). Brandeis, one of Wilson's principal advisors on antitrust matters (see MAso:,
BRANDEis (1946) Part IV, especially c. XXVII), was aware of this problem but con-
sidered the "danger" "extremely small." Nevertheless, he advocated a provision which
would have eliminated one class of dummy by making it unlawful to have a representative
of a director on the board of a competing corporation. He felt, however, that due to the
personal influence of Mr. Morgan, his presence on the board, and not that of one of his
associates, would usually be necessary to accomplish the results that Congress was seeking
to prevent. "You have got to have a big name to conjure with," he -said. Hearings, ,repro,
at 943.
29. This change was reported by Robert P. Vanderpoel, Financial Editor, in the
Chicago Herald-American, May 8, 1948.
30. Commenting on this situation the Financial Editor of the Chicago Herald-Ameri-
can stated: "Clearly if it is improper or undesirable from the public point of viev for the
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There is another common and important type of interlocking direc-
torship not touched by Section 8 that may be used to eliminate compe-
tition: directorships interlocking buyer with seller. A producer of
raw materials or a parts manufacturer frequently has one of its directors
on the board of its principal customer. An important purpose of this
directorship is to iisure that the buyer-seller relationship continues
without the disturbing effects of competition. In times of shortages
of raw materials this situation is reversed; it is the buyer who seeks
to have a representative on the board of his steel supplier, for example,
to insure his source of supply. These directorships frequently are
used to eliminate competition between the supplier and its competitors
or the buyer and its competitors.3 1 Yet, since buyer and seller are not
competitors, this type of interlocking directorship is not, despite its
potential trade-restraining effects, touched by Section 8. It is no answer
to point to the Sherman Act; the restraining effects are subtle and may
often derive from a director's persuasive powers rather than from "con-
tract" or "combination."
It is not unfair to conclude that Section 8, at least as applied to
manufacturing corporations, has accomplished none of the objectives
sought by its sponsors.3 2 As we have seen, the Section has grave
technical defects of which three seem most important. First, the Sec-
tion fails to prohibit a person who is an employee but not a director of
a corporation from serving on the board of a competing corporation.33
Second, it places no limitation upon associates in a single banking
house from serving as directors of competing corporations so long as
each associate serves on the board of a different company. 4 Third, the
Act does not deal with directorships that interlock buyer with seller
despite the fact that such directorships are used to eliminate competi-
tion.35
It would not be an easy task to draft a statute to cover these situa-
tions. Supplementary legislation in this field would probably be more
effective if it were confined to the larger aggregations of capital. A new
statute that would flatly prohibit multiple directorships in corporations
over a certain size, and in addition strengthen the existing provisions of
Section 8 so as to prohibit the same person from holding office or em-
ployment in one corporation as well as a directorship in a competing
corporation would seem to remedy the more important defects.
top men of the two companies to sit on the board and direct the policies of the third con-
cern, it cannot be proper or desirable for second position men, dependent for their jobs on
the top officials to hold such positions." See note 27 supra.
31. See Means, Interlocking Directorates, in 8 ENcyc. oF Soc. Sci. 148 (1932).
32. See CoPay, Housa OF MORGAN 419 (1930).
33. See page 1273 spra.
34. See page 1272 supra.
35. See supra this page.
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The addition of a new paragraph in Section 8 making it unlawful
from and after a period, say, of two years from the date of its enact-
ment, for any person to be an officer, director or employee of more than
one corporation having total assets in excess of 60 million dollars,
whether or not the corporations are competitors, would eliminate most
of the directorships that may be used to limit competition and yet are
not in violation of Section 8 as presently written. 6 By using a figure as
high as 60 million dollars, the Section would strike at the problem in
its most serious aspects 37 without disturbing the boards of any of the
lesser competitors in any given field. Such a statute would affect one
or more directors in from 175-200 manufacturing and mining corpora-
tions and in from 20-25 retailing corporations. 38
One of the premises of the framers of Section 8 was that no person
could effectively direct the affairs of more than one giant corporation.3
Unless we are to abandon this premise as well as the objectives of Sec-
tion 8, legislation along the lines outlined above would seem to be
worthy of serious consideration.
36. See QuINN, I Quir MONSTER BusNxss 35 (1948).
37. Exceptions to this provision would have to be considered, such as one to authorize
an officer, director or employee of a parent to serve its subsidiaries. Possibly also, com-
mon carriers, insurance companies, and banking corporations should be excepted. See
page 1267 supra.
38. See U.S. DEP'T OF CoM., OFFICE OF BUSINESS ECONeOmCS, TAnrE OF Tuous=n
LARGEST MANuFACTURING CORPORATIONS (based on total assets in 1946), and Mco0ys
MANuAL OF INsTmENTs (Industrials) (1947).
39. See BRADEis, OTHER PEOPLE'S MoNEY, c. X (1914); Douglas, Directors Who
Do Not Direct, 47 HAnv. L. REv. 1305 (1934).
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